Abstract: I propose the next steps in the neuropragmatic approach to philosophy that has been advocated by Solymosi and Shook (2013) . My focus is the initial process of inquiry implicit in addressing philosophical questions of cognition and mind by utilizing the tools of neuroscientific research. I combine John Dewey's pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce's three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. My goal is to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. First, I outline Dewey's pattern of inquiry, highlighting the initial problematic phase in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiate the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce's three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.
Neurophilosophy, as exemplified by the work of Patricia and Paul Churchland (cf. P.S. Churchland 2002; P.M. Churchland 2012) , Michael Gazzaniga (1992) , and Sam Harris (2011) , has been primarily an attempt to answer traditional philosophical questions concerning cognition and the mind with facts derived from research on the central nervous system, the greatest focus having been upon the brain.
1 This approach to philosophical questions has delivered a wealth of neuroscientific information to philosophers that may be useful in addressing issues that fall outside the purview of the neurosciences; however, neurophilosophy suffers from a problem of primacy, in which central focus has been given to textbook philosophical questions, combined with neuroscientific data, but at the expense of perhaps more relevant and tractable philosophical questions, as well as data that is not 1 For a thorough criticism of neurophilosophy from this point of view, I recommend (Solymosi 2011a) . HUMAN AFFAIRS 23, 606-615, 2013 DOI: 10.2478 solely neuroscientific (or is not merely brain-centric). This problem of primacy leads, at least on the surface, to a seeming reductionism that does not clearly provide solutions to philosophical questions. Rather, neurophilosophy often merely covers those questions with neuroscientific data without sufficient argument connecting the questions with the proposed answers. For some, the philosophy of neuroscience must be altered dramatically in its approach to philosophical questions if it is to provide viable answers to philosophical problems concerning cognition and mind. The recent work of Tibor Solymosi and John Shook provides a Grundreinigung-a clearing of the ground-for the philosophy of neuroscience, which advocates a synthesis of pragmatic principles and neuroscientific inquiries as a reconstructive response to neurophilosophy (Solymosi 2011a; 2011b; Solymosi and Shook 2013; Solymosi and Shook [forthcoming] ). Thus far, their work has primarily focused on the central tenets of what they have entitled "neuropragmatism" that entails a stark separation from neopragmatism, and neurophilosophy. Their approach to philosophical questions in light of neuroscientific discovery draws heavily upon the work of the Classical American pragmatists, especially the evolutionary philosophy of John Dewey, which they have rightly labeled as a precursor to the general philosophical move toward the sciences in the latter half of the 20 th century. According to Solymosi, "Neurophilosophical pragmatism emphasizes Dewey's method of intelligence as the means for reconstructing our lived experience in light of the advances of neuroscience " (2011b, 154) . From this critical vantage point, neurophilosophy as it currently stands has neglected its evaluative role that has been sustained by neopragmatism, while neopragmatism has neglected important movements within the sciences that neurophilosophy has pursued in addressing and advancing philosophical questions (2011b). Solymosi and Shook call for a re-evaluation of philosophical questions concerning the mind and cognition, which considers neuroscientific research while affirming the evaluative role implicit to philosophical inquiry.
In the following, I propose the next steps in this neuropragmatic approach to philosophy. My focus is the evaluative methodology implicit in addressing philosophical questions by utilizing the sciences as a foundation for inquiry. Specifically, I proffer combining John Dewey's pattern of inquiry with Charles Peirce's three forms of inference in order to outline a methodological schema for neuropragmatic inquiry. This combination is necessary because Dewey's schematic pattern of scientific inquiry is thorough, but lacks a sufficient analysis of hypothesis-generation, which is a fundamental part of the inferential process. In a similar regard, Peirce's three forms of inference are exhaustive qua forms of inference, but they do not adequately account for the framing of problems that lead into the initial moments of hypothesis-generation. Here my goal is a modest one: to establish ignorance and guessing as well-defined pillars of methodology upon which to build a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry. To do this, I first outline Dewey's pattern of inquiry and highlight the initial problematic phase of inquiry in which recognized ignorance provides the basis upon which to frame a philosophical problem and initiates the trajectory by which philosophical questions may be addressed with the assistance of neuroscientific evidence. Second, I provide an outline of Peirce's three forms of inference, focusing upon the first phase of abduction: guessing. Third, I explain the transition between ignorance and guessing, urging the benefit of attending to these two aspects of inquiry. Finally, I provide an initial sketch indicating the next steps concerning a pragmatic reconstruction of neurophilosophy, pointing towards the need for a more thorough examination of scientific methodology within and following analyses of philosophical problems and neuroscientific evidence.
Dewey's pattern of inquiry & ignorance
From its inception as a pragmatic approach to philosophy and neuroscience, neuropragmatism claims an adherence to Dewey's pattern of inquiry (Solymosi 2011b, 164) . For my purposes here, only a cursory outline is required, which provides part of the foundation from which to address philosophical inquiry and neuroscience. 2 Dewey defines inquiry as the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole (LW 12, 108) .
Inquiry is an activity by which our experience-that which is uncontrolled and indeterminate-is transformed via the processes of analysis and synthesis. Analysis is the process of discrimination by which experience is discriminated or divided into particular objects of experience following upon observation and a problem statement(s). Synthesis is the process of identification wherein the objects of experience are unified as a whole (LW 8, 275) . Our experience is analyzed as data, which is discernible material of our experience divided into distinct units so that we might understand the indeterminate situation and attempt to find a solution through reasoning, hypotheses, and experimentation. In the process of synthesis, we utilize this data to formulate what Dewey calls ideas, i.e. suggestions or possible solutions that are to be used to remedy the indeterminate situation (ibid., 197-198) . Between the analysis of experience into data and the synthesis of data into ideas, we search for the cause or causes of the situation by altering our experience in order to test what effects are derived from what causes. In other words, we engage in a fallibilist process of experimentation and possible hypothesis-regeneration until we find a solution to our problem or find that there are, in fact, different problems than initially conceived.
Inquiry begins with an indeterminate situation, what Dewey claims is a disruption between organism and environment. The organism reacts to such disruption in an anticipatory state that Solymosi and Shook have labeled allostasis (in contrast to homeostasis) (forthcoming; cf. Solymosi 2012; Schulkin 2011). Allostasis is the state from which an organism attempts to remedy a disruption. Both Peirce and Dewey indicate that inquiry begins when one's expectations are distinct from what actually takes place (cf. CP 8.270). The disruption between expectation and actuality indicates a lack of knowledge, resulting in the constitution of a problem. "A problem represents the partial transformation by inquiry of a problematic situation into a determinate situation" (LW 12, (111) (112) . With regard to the role of neuropragmatism, the problems with which it deals are philosophical in nature, and defining the problem specifies the particular ignorance with which philosophers are dealing. This is not ignorance in a pejorative sense. Rather, ignorance is defined as "the absence of fact, understanding, insight, or clarity about something" (Firestein 2012, 6) . The clarification of ignorance in a specific manner provides an initial framework for conceiving the problem and ensuing questions.
Ignorance is the acknowledgement of a lack of knowledge with regard to why, how, and/or what is the case. As Stuart Firestein states, "It is not an individual lack of information but a communal gap in knowledge. It is a case where data don't exist, or more commonly, where the existing data don't make sense, don't add up to a coherent explanation, cannot be used to make a prediction or statement about some thing or event" (Firestein 2012, 7) . Ignorance is not given, just as problems are not "self-set" (LW 12, 112). Through establishing a specified problem, we in turn establish that which we do not know but desire to know in order to solve the problem(s) that causes what we might refer to as philosophical allostasis. 3 Firestein specifies that this type of ignorance is "knowledgeable ignorance, perceptive ignorance, insightful ignorance" (Firestein 2012, 7) . One of the most important first steps for neuropragmatic inquiry is not only clearing the ground of assumptions concerning philosophical questions and allegedly correlated neuroscientific answers, but also establishing the specific problems with which we are dealing by defining the ignorance from which we are seeking solutions to those problems. As Firestein states, "Ignorance then is really about the future; it is a best guess about where we should be digging for data" (45). Conceiving the problem and defining the particular ignorance related to that problem facilitates determining hypotheses that are relevant or irrelevant. What a neuropragmatic approach to inquiry suggests is that once specific philosophical problems are (re)conceived and their corresponding ignorance is well-defined, many of the viable hypotheses for solving those problems will be located in neuroscientific domains. For example, Solymosi points to the distinction between the questions, "do humans (really) have free will?" [as put forth by 'traditional' neurophilosophers] and "how does human freedom work? How does it function?" [as reconsidered from the neuropragmatic point of view] (Solymosi 2011, 164) . In order to account for the move from ignorance to possible solutions, neuropragmatic methodology must provide a description of hypothesis-generation. Although Dewey provides insufficient details of this inferential process (cf. LW 12, esp. 114-115), Peirce does offer a robust account of hypothesis-generation with his conception of abduction, specifically the process of guessing that initiates the process and often continues throughout inquiry.
3 Philosophical allostasis is here used as a general state of inquisitiveness combined with creative activity aimed at ameliorating exigency, which is brought about by recognized ignorance concerning questions about life, its meaning, actions, and values. This state is distinct from existential crisis, which can be conceived as the individual or collective feeling of ignorance with regard to life, its meaning, actions, and values, which results in coping rather than amelioration or solution. Philosophical allostasis is also the antithesis of what might be deemed philosophical homeostasis, which would be a general state of stability without inquisitiveness, having designated philosophical questions as meaningless or solved. Those in a state of philosophical homeostasis would likely be dismissive of philosophical questions, denying or ignoring ignorance. [The author thanks T. Solymosi for helpful suggestions with regard to clarifying these terms.]
Peirce's three forms of inference & guessing
Peirce classified three forms of inference: deduction, induction, and abduction (CP 2.100; 5.161). Deduction is simply necessary reasoning in which a conclusion must follow formally from its premises. For example (CP 2.619):
Induction is the type of reasoning utilized in generalizing and affirming (or negating) a theory from a series of observations (CP 2.624). For example (CP 2.623):
Case. -These beans are from this bag.
Result. -These beans are white.
Rule. -All the beans from this bag are white.
Abduction entails adopting an originary hypothesis, which is created via the process of guessing (CP 2.96). Peirce provided the following general syllogism for abduction (CP 5.189):
The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
We may divide abduction into two parts: guessing and hypothesis-selection for experimentation. Guessing is the process by which we begin to address our philosophical problems with a hypothesis. It is, according to Peirce, that with which almost every inquiry must begin because the truth of a matter "requires new ideas for its apprehension" (MS 692, 29; CP 7.218) . Within the process of abduction a guess is a transitional activity between the first premise (The surprising fact, C, is observed), which is part of being in allostasis, wherein ignorance is recognized and a problem defined, and the second premise (But if A were true, C would be a matter of course). Bridging this process of hypothesis-generation with Dewey's pattern of inquiry, guessing is defined as: the initial deliberate originary activity of creating, selecting, or dismissing potential solutions to a problem as a response to that problem and its corresponding ignorance. Guessing consists of being attentive to the process of deliberating about a problem, while taking experimental liberties with the rearrangement and creation of concepts in addressing that problem. A hypothesis for solving the problem is reached and initially accepted through an imaginative process, which Peirce labeled musement. This is the 'motor' of the imagination that leads us in the process of creating a guess, which provides a tentative remedy to a problem (Nubiola 2005, 126) . Musement is coupled with observation, and "allows ideas free play in relation to some issues of wonder" (Anderson 2005, 17) . Through framing specific philosophical questions based upon well-defined problems and ignorance, guessing is a controlled creative inference by which we seek to answer those questions. The contemplation of guessing is a form of musement restricted by the constraints of a particular problem: guessing takes place with the hope that we are moving towards solutions to the problems posed (CP 7.219; Anderson 1987, 43) . This is the second methodological step of neuropragmatism: to engage in controlled creative inference in light of the advances of neuroscience.
To account for guessing as part of philosophical inquiry is to depart from the limited frame of inquiry proffered by Karl Popper that still has residual effects within philosophy of science, including neurophilosophy. This residual and limiting view holds "that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process" (Popper 1959, 31-32) . The process of guessing has typically been designated as part of what Hans Reichenbach deemed the context of discovery, which is separated from the context of justification (Reichenbach 1938; 1951) . Reichenbach advocated rational reconstruction as a logical task of epistemology separated from the task of psychology (1938, (5) (6) . 4 By collapsing the manifest and scientific images and replacing the bifurcation of epistemology and psychology with a continuum connecting common sense and scientific reasoning, the neuropragmatic turn entails a reconception of reconstruction. The reconstruction of inquiry thereby entails the inclusion of all inferential activity, not merely necessary (deductive) or probabilistic (inductive) inference. Neuropragmatism also includes creative (abductive) inference, which provides a synthesis between the pragmatic inquiry of Dewey and the forms of inference as conceived by Peirce.
Initiating philosophical inquiry: ignorance & guessing
Following Dewey's pattern of inquiry, questions of mind and cognition are to be based in precisely outlined problems with a view towards solving those problems with the tools that the sciences and reasoning provide. The bridge between affirmed ignorance and guessing is the reformulation of philosophical problems in light of that ignorance. As Dewey states, "A problem well-put is half-solved" (LW 12, 112) . The focus upon and transition between ignorance and guessing is important for neuropragmatism because it strengthens the reconstructed foundation of philosophical inquiry, thus reaffirming the purpose of the pragmatic turn suggested by Solymosi and Shook: dealing productively with the challenges facing our culture, as developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology bring about both better means for dealing with problems, old and new, and ways of creating new problems, today and tomorrow (2013, 213) .
Reconsidering questions of mind and cognition in light of well-defined ignorance perpetuates the Grundreinigung that clears the way for practically-minded questions. These questions are not to be the well-worn, but ill-conceived, questions retained by neurophilosophy, even in light of neuroscientific developments. As Shook and Solymosi state, "Theories of mind comfortable with taking purity, passivity, receptivity, or representation as basic modes of cognition must be rejected as incompatible with neuroscience" (2013, 220) . By reconsidering our ignorance in formulating our philosophical problems, we may engage in the process of educated guessing, which is the inferential procedure through which "techniques can be experimentally attempted on related problems" in tandem with neuroscientific and neurotechnological evidence and procedures (Solymosi and Shook 2013, 218) . Neuroscientific research does not map directly onto philosophical questions because the questions of scientific fields are different questions based in different problems that stem from differences in ignorance. Neuropragmatism is not a resignation of philosophy to neuroscience. Neuropragmatism is a reconsideration of philosophical ignorance in light of neuroscience. This is one major point that distinguishes neuropragmatism from neurophilosophy.
Well-conceived problems, based in well-defined ignorance, lead to educated guesswork that can generate plausible hypotheses when initially attempting to solve those problems. Guessing is the first inferential step that follows upon the construction of a problem (or set of problems) and related questions. Solymosi and Shook hint at the importance of such a process when they state that reflective deliberation "is a useful imaginative function for specialized human cognition for problem solving" (2013, 224) . Neuropragmatism allows for engaging in educated guessing because it combines available neuroscientific and neurotechnological tools with the reconstruction of philosophical problems concerning mind and cognition, which serves a creative function by opening up a well-defined space of ignorance from which to generate both questions and plausible answers to those questions.
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In contrast, neurophilosophy proceeds by utilizing neuroscientific tools, but as a method by which to address pre-established philosophical questions without rational reconstruction. Although there is guesswork involved in traditional neurophilosophical inquiry, it is an unacknowledged guesswork that proceeds by neglecting the ignorance from which it inquires. This is what we might consider as guessing 'half-cocked', which simply attempts to match neuroscientific data with philosophical questions without re-considering the ignorance from which the questions are constructed. Guessing in this fashion leads to attempts to justify merely "static propositions that objectively mirror or correspondingly represent the nonhuman external world", which is the very antithesis of what Solymosi and Shook claim to do with neuropragmatism (2013, 227) .
By reconstructing the ignorance, problems, and questions with which we are dealing, we reassert the evaluative and value-laden methods implicit to inference. Guessing is thus no longer 'half-cocked' (or reductionist), but grounded in our experience of indeterminate situations reconstructed as determinate. The process of guessing "is conscious, deliberate, and controlled, being open to criticism and self-criticism" (Santaella 2005, 194) . It takes place in media res, utilizing a wide variety of previous experiences, thoughts, and theories (Anderson 1986, 161) . A neuropragmatic stance acknowledges these experiences, thoughts, and theories as a collection of possible tools that may contribute to the guessing process. In addition, these tools are recognized as bound with values that directly influence the way that our ignorance is defined, our problems framed, our questions posed, and our guesses posited. 6 5 For the importance of questioning for knowledge-seeking (Hintikka 1989) . 6 Solymosi provides a rough example of neuropragmatic guessing when he considers "understanding how freedom functions" by beginning with the concept of the body-brain-nexus rather than merely the fronto-medial cortex (Solymosi 2011, 164-166) .
The initial hypothesis-generation concerning philosophical questions is not identical to that performed by the neuroscientists. Unlike neurophilosophy, which often seems to conflate the context of scientific justification with the context of philosophical justification, neuropragmatism recognizes the differences between domains of ignorance from which the problems are defined and questions constructed. This does not result in the 'two worlds' bifurcation collapsed by Solymosi and Shook (cf. 2013) . Rather, distinguishing between neuroscientific and philosophical ignorance indicates that the philosopher cannot merely provide the same argument in proffering a solution to a philosophical question that is distinct from a neuroscientific question. Although both questions might be addressed using similar tools, the philosopher generates new hypotheses through the process of guessing because the philosopher is dealing with different questions, and thus beginning a new series of inferences with regard to those questions that stem from philosophical allostasis. By taking the pragmatic turn with regard to questions of cognition and mind, Solymosi and Shook have provided a space from which to reconstruct such questions with a view towards creating hypotheses that may utilize neuroscientific tools without masking philosophical issues as merely scientific. This allows for neuroscientific data and ideas to become a part of the experience, thoughts, and theoretical backdrop from which we initially guess.
Engaging in the process of inquiry that Dewey advocates begins with ignorance and well-defined problems. It is beneficially combined with a fallibilist process of guessing as hypothesis-generation, which prevents us from merely obfuscating old philosophical problems with new neuroscientific information. These are the first steps towards a methodology of neuropragmatism. Guessing only results in an argument submitted with the possibility of being urged. What follows upon guessing is the second half of the abductive process: the selection of plausible hypotheses to be tested. This requires a methodology for which I cannot here supply the details, but only a suggestive sketch of what I believe will benefit those who wish to take the neuropragmatic turn as promulgated by Solymosi and Shook.
Moving forward: suggestions
Once the process of guessing produces hypotheses as plausible solutions to specific problems, the second part of abduction must be engaged by which to select and utilize a hypothesis for further inquiry. This process entails economic considerations with regard to hypothesis-choice. Peirce indicated that "the leading consideration in Abduction" is economy: "Economy of money, time, thought, and energy" (CP 5.600). These economic considerations drive the process of selecting potential hypotheses as viable options for further consideration. In developing a methodology with which to address the problems of cognition and mind, defining and indicating the values of economic considerations will facilitate a well-founded connection between those hypotheses that are created, i.e. guesses, and those hypotheses that are worthy of being urged as viable solutions to those problems. Economic considerations provide criteria that helps address why some hypotheses are to be entertained while others are to be rejected.
Relatedly, I recommend reconstructing the inferential processes through which hypotheses are applied to philosophical questions that concern cognition and mind. Such reconstruction provides a means by which to address the value ascribed to those solutions that are considered better than others. In other words, the neuropragmatic turn allows for a reconsideration of inference to the best explanation as inference to the best solution, but this calls for explicitly established criteria that accounts for the moves between hypothesesselection, further inference and experimentation, and acceptance. One of the major problems within current neurophilosophy has been the lack of such criteria in selecting and accepting specific neuroscientific studies and data while neglecting others-both from within and outside of neuroscientific domains-in order to address philosophical questions. Because neuropragmatism is problem-oriented, criteria for the value placed upon some posited solutions over others may be founded upon practical goals. As Solymosi and Shook state, "Human cognition in all its modes should primarily be studied and comprehended in terms of its practical service for the ways that humans live" (2013, 215) . This seems to indicate that a foundation for inferential criteria might be in place, but that the details of those criteria with regard to the process of inquiry and its relation to 'practical service for the ways of that humans live' are yet to be established. 7 In order to "establish and cultivate the continuities between science and the humanities, between the scientific image and the manifest images, to improve the richness of living experience in a never-ending process of growth", as Solymosi and Shook claim to seek, a thorough method of inquiry is the next step to a pragmatic approach to neuroscience and philosophical questions concerning cognition and mind (2103, 228) . Fortunately, the ground has been cleared in order to take this next step, which begins with reconsidering ignorance and guessing as fundamental pieces to the foundation of neuropragmatic inquiry.
